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The Problem of Membership in International Organization
W. HARTLEY CLARK
Carleton College

1

ABSTRACT - Membership problems plague international organizations of all types. All organizations are in some way exclusive, and there is a hierarchy of acceptable joiner-nations with
the European nations leading the list. Each organization appears statistically to have a norm of
membership toward which its number tends. If it falls short of the norm, it is under compulsion
to expand. If it exceeds the norm, expulsions or boycotts are likely to ensue. The ideal condition
of an organization, therefore, is "normal" membership, not necessarily "total" inclusion of all
nations legally admissable. More is to be lost by too large an organization than by one too
small. There is a superfluity of discrete national memberships in separate organizotions, which
necessitates amalgamation of organizations.

When President Sukarno of Indonesia declared his intention of withdrawing his country from the United Nations in order to spite the former imperial powers in that
organization, his bombshell was met at first by incredulousness and disbelief, even among his own followers and
among the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations."
They, like many of us, had been living in a world of misconception about the significance of membership in international organizations. They had the vaporous notion
that at all times international organizations seek benevolently to enlarge their membership and that the members
of such international organizations can be expected to
have a benevolent regard for the organizations. There
went along with the notion, too, the idea that there is
nothing decisive in just how many or which organizations a country belongs to-the more the better-in that
membership in one presumably does not contradict
membership in another. An international organization
viewed in this light is like a sponge: soft, benign, and
absorptive.
Indonesia's quitting the United Nations has brought to
the surface the fact that one of the most critical problems faced by international organizations today is the
problem of membership. For instance, the Unjted Nations has faced the problem of membership for Red
China and the question of Soviet Russian membership
in connection with her refusal to pay her assessments for
the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations."
The most critical problem for the Common Market is
British membership. The most critical problem for the
'B.A .. Carleton College; M. A. and Ph. D., New York University. Currently. Assistant Professor of Government and International Relations. Carleton College. His articles have appeared
in American Political Science Review, Midwest Political Scie11ce
Journal. International Conciliation , and in earlier issues of Proceedi11[:s of MAS. A book, Politics of the Common Market, is
forthcoming.
• An Indonesian government note of January 20, 1965 to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations fixed March I, 1965
as terminal date for its withdrawal from the organization. The
Secretary-General indicated his willingness to respect the action
in his note to the Indonesian government of February 26, 1965.
3
The term "membership" here is being used in its literal sense
rather than its technical or legal sense. Legally. China is a member of the United Nations already, and the Red Chinese issue is
dealt with as a problem of representation . If the Russians walked
out over the contributions issue, they would still be likely to
retain legal membership in the organization.
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British Commonwealth of Nations has been South African membership and now, in a sense, Malaysian membership. The problem of Spanish membership plagues
European organizations like NATO and the Council of
Europe. When we add to this such questions as French
membership in SEA TO and Cuban membership in the
Organization of American States, one is tempted to view
the problem of membership as a contemporary crisis in
international organization, were it not for the fact that
such pioneer organizations as the League of Nations
were victims of critical membership problems, too. The
League failed partly because the United States did not
join. The members that were in the League were not adequate to the task of maintaining world security.
Membership Profile

A brief profile of the membership of international organizations wilJ help introduce the problematic aspect of
membership. According to the Yearbook of International
Organizations of 1963- I 964,4 which is my major source
of information on membership in international organizations, there were 141 entities- I I 7 states, and 24 dependencies-holding membership in 162 separate international organizations. The 141 potential members held a
total of 3778 memberships in the 162 organizations. The
fact that there are less than 4000 memberships instead of
6 times that number, as there would be if alJ states belonged to all organizations, is a consequence of the fact
that most international organizations are, for one reason
or another, exclusive. They may be exclusive because they
deal with subject matter that only the technologically
evolved countries can usefully cope with; or because they
deal with objects that exist at only certain points on the surface of the globe, such as certain minerals or certain
foods. They may be exclusive clubs for given regions of
the world, and within given regions there may be further
grounds for exclusiveness on the basis of technological
advancement or geography. The exclusive character of
international organizations is not meant here to mean
the kind of snobbishness or haughtiness that characterizes an exclusive golf club , but merely that, for one rea• Union of International Associations, 9th ed. (Brussels : Union
of International Associations. 1962). The Yearbook is a compendium of summary description of individual international organizations. and it lists the members of each organization.
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son or another, certain nations do not qualify for membership. Lack of qualifications is not a reflection on a
given nation. It is no slur against an African nation that
it cannot become a member of a pan-American organization; it simply is not American.
The tendency for international organizations to be exclusive is borne out by a tabulation of their memberships. Some 60 international organizations have l O or
fewer members; 40 organizations have between 11 and
20 members; 24 have between 21 and 30 members; and
the members continue to decline down to the 81 to 90
bracket, in which there are no organizations at all. This
inverse relation between the number of organizations
and the number of their members changes, however, in
the bracket of organizations with between 10 I and 1 J0
members, where 7 organizations, all in the United Nations family, are represented. This break between the
United Nations family and the tendencies of all other
organizations, suggests that a different type of exclusiveness is applied by the United Nations, albeit, like the
others, it is in some way exclusive.''
Not only do international organizations tend to be exclusive, they rely on a rather exclusive class of desirable
joiners. One-fifth of the nations of the world account for
almost one half of al1 memberships in international organizations. The top 29 nations, in other words, hold
1786 memberships. France, holding membership in 91
organizations, is leader, followed by the Netherlands with
81 memberships. The United States ranks seventh with
64 memberships. It is the European nations that head
the list, by and large, although the large number of interAmerican organizations enables 4 Latin-American countries to figure among the first 29. These, incidentally, are
the largest countries of Latin America. There is a whole
fifth of the nations of the world that belong to no more
than from 12 to 20 international organizations-belong
to little more, in other words, than the United Nations
family. Apart from them, international organizations appear to be made up of exclusive groups of the "right
kinds" of nations.
A Norm of Optimum Si:z:e
In searching for a theory to explain these figures, one
arrives first of all at the idea of an inverse ratio in international organizations between size and effectiveness.
The Common Market is effective, thus, because it is
small; and the United Nations ineffective because it is
huge. Or, put it another way, organizations may become
smaller and smaller in dealing with less and less until
they are completely effective in nothing; or they may become larger and larger in dealing with more and more
until they lose effectiveness in everything. This theory is
too simple, however, to encompass the fact that the
United Nations has a world-wide membership and is capable of effective action in certain instances.
Membership norms are better viewed in their own
terms. In expressing norms here, I use modal averages,
• Charter of the United Nations, Article 4 restricts eligibility
for membership to nations that '"in the judgment of the Organization" can meet their international obligations.
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not mew1s or medians. The norm of membership for the
United Nations and eight other agencies in its family of
organizations is the membership of the United Nations
itself that, though changing slightly from year to year, is
roughly just over I 00. There are some 27 organizations,
including 7 agencies of the U.N. family with a membership norm of only 40. These are organizations that are
open to membership from any nation of the world but
deal with subject matter so technologically demanding
that the world at large cannot cope with it or relate to it.
Technological development here implies wealth and commerce; thus, only certain nations can take part in the
Customs Cooperation Councils or the Refrigeration Institute. In other words, once United Nations specialized
agencies or other world-wide institutions become demanding in this way, their normal membership is cut
down to less than half that of the top United Nations
group. There are some 32 international organizations
that are open to all countries in the world but are relevant only to those nations whom fate and geography
have brought together. The geography of population, for
instance-the population surplus and deficit areas-determines the membership of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration. The geographic accident
of being a littoral state determines the membership of
the International Maritime Consultative Organization
and fishing organizations. These organizations, potentially world-wide but actually limited by geography, have
a normal membership of 20.
Our norms are now dropping very fast. Having
reached this level among the organizations open potentially to the world for members however, the norms begin to level off. The next groups of organizations are
those restricted to members within a given region of the
globe, such as Europe, the Americas, the Middle East,
or the Soviet Bloc. The norm for the 19 inter-American
organizations has been 21 members; the norm for 34
European organizations has been 16 members; the norm
for two middle-eastern organizations has been 12, as
has been the norm for four Soviet Bloc organizations.
Only in the case of the 30 nations who founded the organization of African unity does one find an important
upswing in the number of states embraced by a regional
entity.
There is just one further membership norm worth consideration here and that is one dictated by exclusive considerations within regions; the normal membership
involved here is eight. This last norm is for such organizations as the Common Market, the Carribbean Organization, or the Warsaw Treaty Organization. One of the
most selective norms is that of the organizations made
up on the basis of purely political grounds from among
diverse nations scattered about the globe, such as certain
units of the British Commonwealth of Nations or the alliance organizations, like CENTO or SEATO. This
norm, too, is eight. In summary, then, there are the
world organizations with full world membership, the potential world organizations that, for technological reasons, have only half the world as members, the poten137

tial world organizations that for geographic reasons,
have only one-fifth the world as members, the regional
organizations with from 12 to 21 or 30 members, plus
the restricted regional groupings and political groupings
with a norm of 8.
Expand and/ or Die

What one sees in looking at the membership norms of
various types of organizations is that large groups of
them have far fewer than their potential members: potential world organizations with from 20 to 40 members
and the potential regional organizations with only 8
members. The mandate for expansion among these organizations is fairly clear because, in failing to expand,
they stand to lose touch with the ultimate object of their
efforts. The International Finance Corporation and International Development Association, for example, have
only three-quarters the membership of the United Nations, and neither can count itself fully effective until the
missing quarter is made up. The international organizations of the world concerning fishing are another case in
point. Each is able to regulate fishing in certain areas of
the globe, such as the North Pacific or North Atlantic,
among the littoral nations in those areas. But their fishing grounds are subject to raiding by the ships of governments that are not members, thus repeatedly proving
the necessity for generalizing the world membership of
organizations aiming to conserve and promote the fishing industries.
For other organizations, to expand is to die. A live
man and a dead man look very much alike: the djfferance between the two is extreme but qualjtative-it is
scarcely visible. International organizations can be killed
in the same way. Members can be admitted whose existence in the organization is so destructive of the purposes
and procedures of that body that, although the change is
not visible, qualitatively the organization has changed
and in terms of its original objectives is dead. It is on
this ground that suitors of numerous international organizations are left today on the doorstep. Red China is
kept out of the United Nations for not being peace-loving; Britain has been kept out of the Common Market
as a result of the sin of a triangular love affair involving
the Commonwealth. Spain has been kept out of NATO
and the Council of Europe because it would be a dictatorial wolf among democratic sheep. Yugoslovia was expelled from the Cominform for revisionism; Cuba, from
the organization of American States, for subversion; and
the Union of South Africa, from the British Commonwealth of Nations, for apartheid. Although the merits of
these cases are subject to ongoing debate, the principle
involved is a clear one if one looks at it in ideal terms.
The North Atlantic Treaty organization, for example, is
primarily concerned with organizing military forces for
the defense of Western Europe against attack by Soviet
forces . The Soviet Union, being a European country,
could conceivably join NATO; but, if it did so, it would
kill the organization. NATO's reason-for-being would
be gone. With the Soviet Union as a member, NATO
would be an alliance among aH the greatest powers in
138

the world against a potential aggressor, but there would
no longer be any potential aggressor-hence no reason
for the organization to exist.
The problem of membership in international organizations then, is the question of whether an organization
will die if it expands or whether it will die if it fails to expand. I would advance the thesis that what I define as
"perfect" organizations face grave risks in expanding,
whereas the organizations that I define as "imperfect"
face real danger if they fail to expand. What I define as
"perfect" are the world organizations that incl~de generally all countries in the world, and, also, regional organizations that include generally all countries of the region. The "imperfect" organizations are those with potential world membership that, in fact, have less than all
as members, and the potential regional organizations
that, in fact, have less than all regional nations as members. To put it another way, perfect organizations tend
to have stable norms of membership while imperfect organizations tend to have unstable ones.
Price of Admission

If we are to work with the hypothesis that organizations with "normal" membership, like the United Nations, are best served by greatest caution in the admission of new members, then the presumption would be
against the admission of Red China to that body. 6 Since
the United Nations has very nearly universal membership, which is its ideal, then it is advanced very little
further toward its ideal by the admission of one more
state. And should that state promise any further trouble
for the organization, a cautious policy on admission
would seem the natural one. The question of the admission of Red China to the United Nations is seldom discussed in terms of the interests of the organization itself,
apart from that of any of its members. There are governments that admire Red China or fear it and feel that
something should be done for China. They are not concerned directly with doing anything for the United Nations. It is their interests and not that of the organization
that govern. Unless a case can be made that Red China
can do something for the United Nations, one fails to
find any solid grounds for its admission. It might transpire that, in the event of the admission of Red China, the
price of admission might be paid by other United Nations members in the form of disrupted procedures and
the obstruction of the interests of the majority of mem-ber nations. Such a price could scarcely fall within the
interests of the organization.
There is some value for neutral nations in the comfort
that comes from the existence in the United Nations of·
a powerful veteran obstructionist like the Soviet Union.
Its willingness to disagree with the former imperial powers of the West serves to protect the feeling of neutrality
of those new and weak nations that hate Western imperialism above all. But the United Nations can utilize
only one of this breed. What is the added value in hav• The most complete discussion of the Chinese representation
issue is found in Brown (1955).

The Minnesota Academy of Science

ing two, both Russia and China? The argument that
United Nations membership might appease China and
mollify her is, in effect, offering up the United Nations as
a sacrifice to detract China from some other potentional
object of her desires and has nothing to do with the edification of the United Nations itself. The idea that
China would behave differently inside the United Nations
than out of it is guesswork.
Essentially, the same line of reasoning would underline the desirability of leaving the questionable suitor nations standing at the doorstep of any world or regional
organization having a generally full complement of members. They could be left there indefinitely. 7 The United
Nations applied loose standards over the past decade
while its drive for universality necessitated wholesale admissions of newly independent nations. Otherwise it
would have had a patently abnormal membership and
could thus justify putting membership growth on a par
with integrity as an ideal. Now that universality has been
regained, it would be natural for the United Nations to
become more conscious of its integrity and more willing
to make calculated judgments on admissions, suspensions, and expulsions. The Indonesian secession from the
United Nations may have awakened that institution to
the possibility that, perhaps, under the circumstances Indonesia should have been expelled. The League of Nations was not destroyed by the withdrawal of the Axis
powers and the expulsion of Russia. What proved the inefficacy of the League was its inability to take action
against the Axis powers in Asia, Africa, or Europe; and
it would have faced the same problem whether the Axis
powers had remained in the League or not-possibly Jess
of a problem if out, for then they could not have disrupted proceedings.
The Goose That Laid The Golden Egg

The organizations, world-wide or regional, that have
imperfect memberships, i.e., significantly fewer than the
number of potential members, appear governed by a
logic that is almost the reverse of the foregoing. The European Community of the "Six"-Benelux, France, Germany, and Italy-aspires to become a United States of
Europe. For this it must have both integrity and members. The slow progress of the Council of Europe toward
the same goal, even though it included all the states of
Europe, prompted the Six to make a start toward a
United Europe by advancing integration among themselves, although they constituted Jess than half the European states. The imperfectness and instability of this approach became apparent almost immediately: The Community found it impractical to proceed too far toward
unity without carrying the other European states, particularly Britain, along with them; and the British failed to
see how they could prosper outside the framework of a
European trading block. Negotiations for British membership eventually broke down in 1963, however, be'Although little is availabl'e as yet on the ostracism of Cuba
and of the Union of South Africa from their respective organizations, Spanish ostracism from NATO is discussed in Whitaker
( 1961 ).
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cause the deGauHe government of France did not wish
to taint the integrity of the existing community by admitting Britain and all its outside involvements, particularly those with the United States and the British Commonwealth.' The European Community had accomplished a miracle in inspiring and underpinning vast economic growth in Western Europe. Why kill the goose
that laid the golden egg by tinkering with the membership question?
Thus will the necessity for imperfect organizations to
expand their membership always be subverted. It is the
anticipation of higher benefits that causes an imperfect
organization to take the risk of accepting new members
into its ranks, but there are apt to be be immediate,
though lesser, benefits in remaining exclusive. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
is a conspicuously imperfect organization. It attempts to
co-ordinate international assistance funds going to the
underdeveloped world, but includes as members only the
wealthier and donor nations. Possibly, if some new and
more ample organization could encompass both donor
and recipient nations in its membership a higher degree
of perfection might be achieved in its program. But why
disturb the goose? The donor nations might be more generous with their money within the framework of the
OECD than within the framework of some more representative organization. The irony of this situation is that
false trust in the benefits of exclusiveness is just as damaging to imperfect organizations as false trust in the
benefits of absolute universality is to perfect ones.
The Measure of Man

There is another reasonable standard of membership
that derives from the nature of man rather than from
geography. Of the 162 international organizations 124
have 30 or fewer members. They are, for the most part,
organizations in which all members can take part in all
organs or functions. There can be much lost to an international organization of any type once its membership
passes the point where all members can sit down together
and in a relatively unstructured way talk over their plans
or differences. Since no regional organization has more
than 30 members, they will never have to face the problem in an acute form; but the nearly 60 organizations
with potentially world-wide membership will be affected,
probably in a way that will limit their memberships.
Here again, the natural dynamics of international organizations makes for exclusiveness.
In order for an organization to break away from this
restrictive influence it must establish a constitutional system by which less than all members can act for all. In
setting its sights on world-wide membership, the League
of Nations instituted such a system under the Council,
whose membership was limited, and a similar arrangement was made later in the United Nations Security
Council. The executive councils of other world organizations have been given varying degrees of authority to ex• Although possibly overdone, this theme is thoroughly discussed in Nora Beloff ( 1963) .
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ercise their organizations' power. But such constitutional
arrangements, which are a sine qua non in world organizations, are difficult to achieve and maintain. The system of executive councils in the League of Nations and
early United Nations was not put to a severe test because
the memberships of world organizations then was between 25 and 50; and there remained the potentiality of
effective action even in plenary session and in committees of the whole. It has been the surpassing of the 100member figure that has put the United Nations Councils
to the test and, as we have seen, United Nations Charter
revision has had to begin in order to ad just the constitutional order to the massive increase in membership.
ln order to have a world organization, there was no
choice but to exceed " human dimensions" in the size of
its membership. There simply could not be "conversation" among all the nations of the world, and they had
to act through a constitutional system by which all members were represented by a few in an executive council.
The problem was not that the world organization became
too big, but that it grew too fast. The United Nations had
growth pains during the early Sixties as new voting
groups struggled to find their places in the organization,
as the structure appeared to need some doing over, and
as the Secretariat strained to include nationals of the new
members. The Common Market anticipated similar
growing pains in connection with the admission of Britain along, with the trading partners that had formed the
European Free Trade Association.
Human dimensions are not only a natural limitation
on the size of membership of any given organization,
they are a limitation on the number of organizations a
single nation can join effectively. It is by no means to
the benefit of the European nations that they are members of so many organizations: the United Nations family, numerous other world organizations and equally numerous European organizations. Multiple membership is
a necessary evil. Many organizations exist in Europe because they were each started by slightly different membership, and the difference in membership continued to
keep them apart. Likewise, the slight differences among
the membership in organizations of the United Nations
family has succeeded in keeping them apart. The International Labor Organization has an interest in preserving
its tripartite membership of representatives of governments, employers, and labor unions. The United Nations
financial organizations must do without the communistbloc nations and certain of the less developed nations. A
place must be found for the Holy See in the Universal
Postal Union.
The price of the multiplicity of organizations is poor
co-ordination and the diffusion of interest and effort
among member nations. The value of the amalgamation
of institutions has been demonstrated recently in the
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struggle to unify the Coal and Steel Community, the
Common Market and Euratom within an over-arching
European Community. The fusion was resisted by the
deGaulle government on the grounds that it would
strengthen the Community unduly. Fusion was promoted
by the other members of the Community precisely to
achieve greater strength. Earlier, the United Nations took
steps to strengthen itself by amalgamating its sister organizations within a single financing scheme for technical assistance that it controlled through its Economic
and Social Council.
One can recognize the motive for leaving a fledgling
international organization to the nations that show an
interest in membership. It is impossible to force a larger
membership upon it, because unwilling members could
simply say "no" and refuse to co-operate. But when a
variety of organizations have evolved to the point where
their memberships approximate the membership norms
of their regions, or approximate world-wide membership,
then there is good reason to amalgamate sister organizations and thus help diminish the number of memberships
in international organizations by individual nations to
"human " proportions. Can France validly argue that it
is able to co-ordinate its interests in 91 international organizations simultaneously? Once again we see here a
reason to value the restriction, even diminution, of memberships in international organizations.
1t appears in the last analysis that, quite contrary to
the notion that international organizations are served by
a loose and absorbtive concept of their memberships
( except in specific cases where organizations suffer from
membership deficits), most additional membership can
be undesirable, from several points of view. It may be
positively destructive of the goals and, therefore, of the
life of an organization. It may be a case of "too much
too soon." Or it may exceed humanly manageable proportions. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of
memberships is their superfluity, deriving from a superfluity of organizations of parallel membership; and the
cause of excess or harmful memberships is more apt to
be interests of individual nations rather than the interests of the organizations themselves.
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